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NatioNalism aNd miNorities iN the ottomaN BalkaNs: 
Greek discourses oN the easterN crisis (1875–1878)
Christos Iliadis
abstract: This article focuses on how the eastern crisis of 1875–1878 and the slavic 
revolts were interpreted in Greece, given its national aspirations and its relationship 
with the orthodox people of the Balkans. The analysis draws on the athenian press 
and parliamentary minutes of the time, and rather than focusing on the diplomatic 
developments follows instead the social discourses on and dominant interpretations 
of the slavs and Bulgarians after the Balkan uprisings as well as the dilemmas faced by 
Greece. it explores a moment in the discursive shift, which introduced an ethno-racial 
language within the Greek kingdom that began to replace the portrayal of hellenism as 
an ecumenical ideology with one of a more exclusive and nationalistic character. it thus 
shows how the events sharpened the division between hellenism and slavism.
This article focuses on Greek public discourses on the eastern crisis, from 1875 
to 1878, as manifested in the parliament and press. in particular, emphasis is 
placed on how the Balkan revolts and the european pro-slavic movement, which 
emerged after the massacre in the Bulgarian city of Batak, were interpreted in 
Greece, especially in light of its own irredentist aspirations in ottoman areas 
with orthodox populations. This contribution is, therefore, concerned with the 
following questions: what was the Greek reaction, as mirrored in public responses, 
to pan-european sympathy for the southern slavs after the Batak massacre? What 
were the effects of the eastern crisis on Greek irredentist politics? did the eastern 
crisis alter Greek discourses on the other Balkan nations? in answering these 
questions, this study will shed light on a crucial moment in the emergence of 
national antagonisms between the Greeks and Bulgarians regarding the future 
of ottoman territories with mixed populations, such as macedonia and Thrace.1
research for this article was funded by the european commission and the Greek General 
secretariat for research and technology (Gsrt) under the action aristeia-excellence. special 
thanks to Professor alexis heraclides. i want to also particularly thank damian mac con 
uladh, of The Historical Review/La Revue Historique, for his excellent copy-editing work.
1 loring m. danforth, The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational 
World, Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1995; anastasia karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, 
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The multiple ways the eastern crisis – and in particular the revolts of the 
Balkan nations – were interpreted in Greece in relation to the country’s irredentist 
aspirations have not been sufficiently examined. The same applies to the effects 
of the 1875–1878 period on the intensification of national antagonism among 
the orthodox population of the ottoman empire – especially that between 
the Greeks and Bulgarians. The majority of existing literature focuses on the 
diplomatic consequences of the Batak massacre and subsequent developments 
over the course of the eastern crisis, especially regarding the Great Powers.2 
more particularly, on the question of the origin of Greek anti-slavic and anti-
Bulgarian discourses, most studies refer to the establishment of the Bulgarian 
exarchate in 1870 or the crimean War in 1856, with the eastern crisis relegated 
– surprisingly – to only a few sentences, if at all.3
of course, certain studies do recognise the importance of the eastern crisis in 
establishing the antagonism between the Greek and Bulgarian national projects; 
however, they generally do not explore in detail Greek discourses on the slavs, 
or they only fully explore their diplomatic results.4 There are also studies that 
examine the athenian press and parliamentary minutes – material similar 
Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870–1990, chicago: university 
of chicago Press, 1997; Victor roudometof, Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic 
Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question, Westport: Praeger, 2002. 
2 John a. marriott, The Eastern Question: A Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 
oxford: clarendon, 1956; evangelos kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, 1875–1878, 
Thessaloniki: institute for Balkan studies, 1975; a. l. macfie, The Eastern Question, 1774–1923, 
london: longman, 1996; alexis heraclides and ada dialla, “intervention in the Bulgarian 
atrocities”, chap. 6 in Historizing Humanitarian Intervention: The Long Nineteenth Century, 
athens: Panteion university of social and Political sciences, 2015, pp. 175–230.
3 For example, lucian N. leustean, Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism in Nineteenth-
century Southeastern Europe, New York: Fordham, 2014; Paraskevas matalas, Έθνος και 
Ορθοδοξία: Οι περιπέτειες μιας σχέσης. Από το ‘Ελλαδικό’ στο Βουλγαρικό σχίσμα [Nation 
and orthodoxy. adventures of a relationship: from the “Greek” to the Bulgarian schism], 
rethymno: crete university Press, 2002, p. 163; karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, p. 78; 
roudometof, Collective Memory, p. 139; christina koulouri, Ιστορία και Γεωγραφία στα 
Ελληνικά Σχολεία (1834–1914) [history and geography in Greek schools, 1834–1914], athens: 
historical archive of Greek Youth, 1988; spyridon Ploumidis, “symbiosis and Friction in 
multiethnic Plovdiv/Philippoupolis: The case of the Greek orthodox and the Bulgarians 
(1878–1906)”, Phd diss., king’s college london (university of london), 2004.
4 Yannis N. Yannoulopoulos, “Η ευγενής μας τύφλωσης...” Εξωτερική Πολιτική και 
“Εθνικά Θέματα” από το 1897 έως τη Μικρασιατική Καταστροφή [“our national blindness…” 
Foreign policy and ‘national issues” from 1897 to the asia minor catastrophe], athens: 
Vivliorama, 2003, pp. 61–62; Αda dialla, “russian Nationalism and the eastern Question: 
The case of Panslavism (1856–1878)”, Modern Greek Studies Yearbook 24–25 (2008–2009), 
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to that examined here – in order to account for Greek interpretations of the 
Balkan nations; however, these do not explore in detail the period after the Batak 
massacre and the discussions and debates that this entailed. Basil c. Gounaris, 
for example, studies representations and stereotypes of the Balkan nations in the 
Greek press of the time, but he treats the period from the crimean War (1856) 
to the Berlin treaty (1878) as a homogenous one, without sufficiently examining 
details of the transformations, shifts and changes in the Greek approach to the 
slavs and Panslavism.5 
in light of the above, this article argues that, when sufficiently examined, details 
of the impact of the Batak massacre – and of the eastern crisis in general – help us 
to better understand the growth of anti-slavism in Greece and the establishment 
of a Greco-Bulgarian national antagonism over the orthodox subjects of the 
empire – especially in the macedonia region. The same can be said regarding public 
interpretations within Greece of the events in Batak and the eastern crisis. 
my claim is not that the eastern crisis gave birth to the ideology of anti-
slavism in Greece, or that anti-slavism can be traced to a single moment of 
emergence. as has already been argued in the literature, the crimean War was 
certainly a crucial factor in generating Greek anti-slavism, and other periods and 
events were also important for its full development, including the establishment 
of the Bulgarian exarchate, the Greco-turkish War (1897), the ilinden uprising 
(1903) and the Balkan Wars.6 The argument here is that this period is also 
important for further disrupting the relations between the Greeks and the 
slavic nations. in order to shed light on the impact of the crisis, this article uses 
material drawn from the proceedings of the Greek parliament and from the 
athenian press at the time.7 The focus is not on confidential exchanges between 
diplomats or on certain events, but on the various ways the eastern crisis was 
p. 101; heraclides and dialla, “intervention in the Bulgarian atrocities”; kofos, Greece and 
the Eastern Crisis.
5 Basil c. Gounaris, Τα Βαλκάνια των Ελλήνων [The Balkans of the Greeks], athens: 
epikentro, 2007, pp. 375–382. 
6 matalas, Έθνος και Ορθοδοξία [Nation and orthodoxy]; karakasidou, Fields of Wheat; 
roudometof, Collective Memory.
7 unless differently stated, press articles studied here are the editorials. at that time, 
newspapers published in the Greek kingdom rarely included other opinion pieces except 
editorials. on the other hand, the available diplomatic exchanges between the Greek foreign 
ministry and the Greek consulates (available at http://arxeio.mfa.gr/portal/) are not extensive 
and they usually include no more than the translation of articles from european newspapers. 
see, for example files, 1876, aak/B, 1876, aak/e, 1866, 99/1a; 1876, 1bg; 1876, 37 and 1877, 
aak/d6. For an account of the diplomatic developments during the crisis, see heraclides and 
dialla, “intervention in the Bulgarian atrocities”, pp. 175–230.
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interpreted in public; of what were seen as problems for a variety of actors, how 
they arose, which of them became significant, and how political dichotomies 
and antagonisms were constructed.8
Hellenism and Slavism before the Eastern Crisis
over the course of the nineteenth century, the orthodox millet started to 
crumble. National ideals gradually replaced the influence of the clergy and 
the domination of the orthodox Patriarchate, creating an ethnic antagonism 
between the newly emerging nations and their state institutions in a struggle 
for the hearts and minds of the Balkan people. Greek and Bulgarian national 
antagonisms within orthodox communities were the first to emerge, and their 
competition for the establishment of “national” churches and schools had 
already started in the early 1860s.9 
The crimean War (1853–1856) resulted in a new phase of internal division 
concerning the eastward or westward direction of the Greek nation, with a 
strengthening of the eastward camp. The war boosted pro-russian irredentism 
in Greece, and its Greek supporters saw the russian empire as pursuing the 
dissolution of the ottoman empire in favour of the interests of its orthodox 
communities. on the other side, the Western powers – especially Britain – 
cooperated with the ottomans, and their Greek supporters were in favour of a 
“cultural” – as opposed to a military – victory for the Greek nation, through the 
hellenisation of the empire.10 however, the russian failure and ottoman victory 
in the war brought disappointment. as a result, new voices defending the integrity 
of the ottoman empire and condemning russian expansionism emerged. in a 
characteristic example, constantinos dossios, formerly a prominent russophile, 
changed sides, arguing in a leaflet published in 1854 under the title “Ελληνισμός ή 
Ρωσσισμός?” (hellenism or russianism?) that the only way the Greek race could 
survive and prosper was through the reform of the ottoman state.11
The rise of the Bulgarian issue in the middle of the nineteenth century affected 
the Greek pro-russian and pro-Western camps in different ways. For those who 
8 For the theoretical framework followed here, see michael Foucault, “Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, history”, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul rabinow, london: Penguin, 1984, pp. 
83–84. also, for the role of “disruption” and the dislocation of identities, ernesto laclau, New 
Reflections on The Revolution of Our Time, london: Verso, 1990, pp. 61–64.
9 karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, p. 81; leustean, Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism, 
introduction. 
10 matalas, Έθνος και Ορθοδοξία [Nation and orthodoxy], p. 118.
11 Vangelis kechriotis, “markos renieris: What is Greece? West or east?”, in Discourses of 
Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe (1770–1945), vol. 2, ed. Balázs trencsényi and 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 08:33:15 |
 Nationalism and Minorities in the Ottoman Balkans 217
saw russia as the protector of orthodoxy, slavic national movements were viewed 
as a Western–catholic plot to divide the orthodox people. in time, however, 
the concept of Bulgarian autonomy came to be accepted within the framework 
of a more general fraternity among the orthodox peoples. For the pro-Western 
camp, the paramount aim was to reform and hellenise the ottoman empire by 
occupying it culturally, thus transforming it into a new hellenic empire. For 
advocates of this view, orthodox slavs were considered backward and in need 
of hellenisation. Thus, the Bulgarian national and ecclesiastical movements and 
Panslavism became the main enemies of this strain of Greek nationalism.12 
in 1870, the establishment of the Bulgarian exarchate, through its separation 
from the ecumenical Patriarchate, and the schism that followed (1872) signalled 
the first important clash between Greek and Bulgarian nationalisms, rather 
than solely manifesting as a dispute over religious doctrines. The exarchate was 
celebrated as an early victory of Bulgarian nationalism over Greek nationalism 
and served as a useful instrument in Bulgarian efforts to establish and expand 
their national community and influence among the orthodox christian 
populations of the empire.13 The Bulgarian issue gave rise to a redefinition of 
the relationship between hellenism and orthodoxy. With the establishment of 
their national church and the schism from the patriarchate, Bulgarians seemed in 
Greek eyes to have transformed from brothers into enemies of hellenism, which 
was now seen by many in Greece as a shield against slavic expansionism. The 
schism, together with the eastern crisis, resulted in a revision of the catalogue 
of perceived enemies of the Greeks, with the Bulgarians rising to the very top 
of the list.14
The Eastern Crisis and the Greek Dilemma
The powerful explosion of the national liberation movement in Bulgaria in april 
1876, and the wars for the independence of serbia and montenegro from the 
ottoman empire which began shortly thereafter, marked the beginning of a 
michal kopeček, Budapest: central european university Press, 2007, p. 310. For the implications 
of the war on the relations between the Greeks and slavs, also elli skopetea, Το “πρότυπο 
Βασίλειο” και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα [The “model kingdom” and the Great idea], athens: Politipo, 
1988, pp. 325–346. For skopetea, anti-slavism operated during the eastern crisis for Greece 
in a double way: “as an excuse for non-intervention and as a slogan for action” (pp. 334–335). 
12 Matalas, Έθνος και Ορθοδοξία [Nation and Orthodoxy], pp. 204–209.
13 l. s. stavrianos, The Balkans, 1815–1914, New York: holt, rinehart and Winston, 1963, 
pp. 366–372; danforth, Macedonian Conflict, p. 58. 
14 matalas, Έθνος και Ορθοδοξία [Nation and orthodoxy], p. 343; dialla, “russian 
Nationalism”, pp. 101 and 104.
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new stage in the so-called eastern crisis. The crisis had begun with uprisings in 
herzegovina and Bosnia in July 1875 but was deepened by the bestial suppression 
of the april uprising in Bulgaria – the Batak massacre in particular – and 
the russo-turkish War of 1877–78.15 The atrocities committed by ottoman 
irregulars against Bulgarian civilians in may 1876 provoked an international 
outcry and had a significant impact on the recognition of autonomous Bulgaria 
in 1878. according to reports of the period, almost 5,000 peasants lost their lives 
during the Batak massacre alone, and some sources estimate that up to 30,000 
Bulgarians were killed – with over a hundred towns and villages destroyed, burnt 
and looted – during the entire course of the Bulgarian horrors.16 
in recent years, the prevailing account of events in Batak has been 
challenged.17 at the time, however, reports on the atrocities generated strong 
pro-Bulgarian sentiment among the european public and within diplomatic 
circles. according to leften stavrianos, “a storm of moral indignation swept 
over europe and especially england”.18 Ιn Britain, public condemnation of the 
Batak massacre was widespread. Gladstone’s pamphlet, which agitated for the 
expulsion of the ottomans from europe, sold 200,000 copies within a month and 
did more than any other publication of the century to demolish pro-ottoman 
sentiment in Britain. Gladstone demanded autonomy for christian subjects of 
the ottoman empire so that they might be freed from the oppression of ottoman 
administrators and soldiers. in russia, news of the massacres also evoked a wave 
of sympathy and support for the Bulgarian people.19 The Bulgarian horrors, 
15 macfie, Eastern Question, pp. 34–45; symeon damianov, “european diplomacy and the 
eastern crisis up to the Beginning of the russo-turkish War”, in Insurrections, Wars, and the 
Eastern Crisis in the 1870s, ed. Béla király and Gale stokes, New York: atlantic, 1985, p. 61. 
16 damianov, “european diplomacy”, pp. 51–53.
17 Baleva and Brunnbauer challenged dominant interpretations of the events, arguing that 
the number of victims had been greatly exaggerated and claiming that the representation of the 
massacre is typical of all Balkan nations’ narratives about their heroic struggles for liberation. 
These allegations created an emotionally charged, negative reaction within academic and 
other circles in Bulgaria. ulf Brunnbauer and martina Baleva (eds.), Batak ein bulgarischer 
Erinnerungsort/Batak kato mjasto na pametta, sofia: iztok-Zapad, 2007. 
18 stavrianos, The Balkans, 1815–1914, p. 66.
19 marriott, Eastern Question, pp. 329–332; m. s. anderson, The Eastern Question, 
1774–1923, london: macmillan, 1966, p. 184; W. e. Gladstone, Lessons in Massacre; Or the 
Conduct of the Turkish Government in and About Bulgaria Since May, 1876, london: murray, 
1877. For a more recent account on the russian reaction, see James Peter Phillips, “The 
eastern crisis, 1875–1878, in British and russian Press and society”, Phd diss., university 
of Nottingham, 2012. on the way the events contributed to the emergence of the policies 
of humanitarianism in Britain, see Georgios Giannakopoulos, “a British international 
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so-called at the time, helped to precipitate the intervention of foreign powers, 
which, in turn, led to the creation of the first autonomous Bulgarian principality 
in 1878. The crisis of 1875–78 also brought about the recognition of both serbia 
and romania as independent states, and it transferred Bosnia and herzegovina 
to de facto habsburg rule. Nevertheless, it did not meet all the demands of the 
Balkan nationalities. These demands now began to conflict with one another.20 
For the Greeks, the eastern crisis of 1875–78 occurred at an inopportune 
moment. having experienced destructive setbacks in the 1850s (crimean War 
insurrections) and 1860s (cretan revolution), Greeks had chosen to pursue 
a strategy of peaceful coexistence with the ottoman empire. This coexistence 
seemed at the time to serve the long-term interests of hellenism. military 
confrontation was seen as problematic for a variety of reasons, as it meant 
aligning Greece with the russian scheme for the dismemberment of the ottoman 
empire, as well as striking up alliances with the Balkan slavs. many Greeks 
strongly questioned the wisdom of placing Greek national aspirations under 
the wing of the russian tsar.21 
For the reasons outlined above, the Greek government did not support 
any of the Balkan revolts of the 1875–78 period, maintaining instead a neutral 
stance. This position was favoured by the king, who retained an influential role 
in foreign affairs. in keeping with the position, the koumoundouros government 
declined to offer the assistance requested by the serbs after their revolt in 
1876.22 a similar approach was demonstrated by the response of the short-lived 
deligeorgis government to the demands by private initiatives of Greek patriots 
for insurrectionary preparations.23
however, despite both official neutrality and a growing anti-slavism, news of 
the Balkan revolts prompted intense public debates and a political conflict within 
Greece about the best policy towards the revolts, relations with the slavs and 
the future of the relationship between Hellenism and Panslavism. The eastern 
humanitarianism? humanitarian interventions in eastern europe (1875–1906), Journal of 
Modern Greek Studies 34/2 (2016), pp. 299–320. 
20 stavrianos, The Balkans, 1815–1914, p. 64; anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 217–218. 
21 evangelos kofos, “Greek insurrectionary Preparations, 1876–1878”, in király and 
stokes, Insurrections,Wars, and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870s, pp. 181–198.
22 alexandros koumoundouros (1815–1883) served as prime minister multiple times. 
With brief interruptions, he retained his position from 27 october 1875 to 15 march 1882. 
John s. koliopoulos and Thanos m. Veremis, Modern Greece: A History Since 1821, oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp. 44–56.
23 douglas dakin, Η Ενοποίηση της Ελλάδας, 1770–1923 [The Unification of Greece, 
1770–1923], trans. athanasios Xanthopoulos, athens: miet, 2012, p. 186.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 08:33:15 |
220 Christos Iliadis 
crisis also engendered political instability in the small Greek kingdom, and in 
the space of three years, the office of prime minister changed hands seven times. 
The end of this period saw the traditional Greek struggle against ottoman rule 
increasingly giving way to a contest for predominance over the slavs; a contest 
that turned into an undeclared war lasting for almost 30 years.24
The Bosnian Revolt and the Greek Dilemma
News of the uprising in herzegovina was not particularly welcomed in Greece. 
The country was unprepared militarily, its relations with russia were strained 
and a slavic solution to the eastern Question, at that moment, could only mean 
the postponement of hellenic aspirations. For that reason, Prime minister 
trikoupis declared that the only road for Greece was a policy of friendship and 
cooperation with the ottoman empire.25
The outbreak of the revolt immediately revealed the main points of 
convergence and divergence in Greek public discourses. Very quickly, the Greek 
dilemma had become obvious: “is [hellas] going to remain uninvolved, or will it 
help the serbs […]?” as Ταχυδρόμος put it in its editorial.26 For the majority, this 
dilemma had a single answer: neutrality was the best way to serve the interests 
of hellenism. as Ταχυδρόμος continued, “Greece has no intention of getting 
involved in affairs alien to its beliefs and interests, remembering the well-known 
events in crete […] the general feeling in Greece supports neutrality” (17 august 
1875). another paper, Η Ώρα27 also encouraged “strict neutrality” and implied 
that everybody in Greece shared a similar opinion: that “every Greek is aware 
of Greece’s international obligations and of its interest; that is, to maintain and 
develop good relations with anatolia […] and to cooperate with it in advancing 
the orient” (11 November 1875). The view that it was in the interests of the 
Greeks to remain neutral and develop peaceful relations with the ottomans was 
also found in the pages of Αυγή (19 July 1875).28 
despite convergence on the general Greek strategy and in reflecting the 
official position, there was divergence within the Greek press on the precise 
24 kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, pp. 259–260; danforth, Macedonian Conflict; 
karakasidou, Fields of Wheat.
25 kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, pp. 43–45.
26 Ταχυδρόμος (17 august 1875). all translations from Greek texts are by the author.
27 Η Ώρα (1875–1888) was published by the political party of harilaos trikoupis, leader 
of the opposition.
28 Αυγή (1857–1876) was royalist during the first years of its publication but became 
more neutral after 1864: kostas mayer, Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Τύπου: Τόμος Α’ (1790–1900) 
[history of the Greek press, vol. 1. 1790–1900], athens: dimopoulos, 1957, p. 79.
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attitude towards the revolts. For some, like Η Ώρα, which at the same time 
was calling for neutrality, the revolts were welcomed as “a major incident in 
the history of eastern europe […] as one of the most important incidents in 
contemporary european history”, because of the crisis they introduced into 
the ottoman empire. The paper, therefore, expressed its “sympathy towards 
those fighting to overcome repression”. however for others, like Αυγή, there 
were important reasons to remain “indifferent” to the struggle. The failure of 
past revolts – such as the cretan revolution – showed that involvement in 
independence struggles could simply exhaust Greek strength without actually 
harming the ottoman empire. There was also a fear that a wider slav revolt 
would be detrimental to Greek interests: “if this evil expands in Bulgaria, it is 
not only the power of the ottomans that will be in danger, but also that of the 
Greek clergy”. For Αυγή, “the Greek and slavic races” were distinct, which meant 
that it was “impossible for any Greek government to show any sympathy for the 
slav movement”.29
The beginning of the eastern crisis, therefore, once again posed a problem for 
the strategy of hellenism: that of choosing sides and deciding whether to follow 
a policy of provoking unrest – and, at the same time, assisting the slavic struggle 
– as a means of pursuing independence for the Greek orthodox populations 
of the empire, or whether to wait instead for a safer moment to pursue Greek 
national aspirations. There was little disagreement that the best option was to 
wait. There was, however, considerable disagreement on two consequent matters. 
The first was on how – militarily or diplomatically – to be prepared for such a 
future opportunity. The other, which was the more important in the long term, 
had to do with how the slav revolts should be understood: were they, in the grand 
scheme of things, fortunate events for hellenism – but events which had simply 
come at a bad moment – or did they pose a threat?
The Batak Massacre: Hope and Disappointment
The Bulgarian uprising and the massacre that followed in may 1876 underlined 
the above problem – the difficulty of choosing sides – in a more pressing manner. 
The events were interpreted in Greece as proof of an urgent need to prepare 
militarily for a possible future encounter. While the events of may did not alter 
the Greek policy of neutrality, they put it under pressure. international solidarity 
with the victims of the massacre – and by association, sympathy for the Bulgarian 
uprising – strengthened those in Greece who argued for an orthodox coalition 
with the Balkan nations. The events of the Bulgarian uprising, therefore, boosted 
29 Αυγή (19 July 1875 and 22 august 1875). 
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public debate on which strategy hellenism should follow, and was a cause of 
unrest in many Greek cities.30 
after the Bulgarian uprising, several newspapers claimed that the 
koumoundouros government – which was perceived as russophile – now faced 
a dilemma on whether to shift its policy from neutrality to intervention. Pro-
government papers such as Άγγελος argued that Greece did not need to start 
a war against the ottomans; it would be enough for the Greek interests if “the 
Greek people of turkey participate in the struggle [against the ottomans], in 
order to create new troubles for the Porte”.31
rumours of Greek government support for an uprising of the ottoman 
Greeks, as well as international pressure, obliged athens to declare in June that 
it would not get involved in the uprisings and would not change its friendly 
policy towards the empire, “maintaining strict neutrality in its dispute with the 
slavs”. however, on the day of these declarations, popular leaders of the famous 
Komitata (armed bands) from the areas of epirus, Thessaly and crete met in 
athens to discuss the possibilities of a synchronised uprising. These activities 
cast doubt on the government’s official neutrality. reports on an initiative by 
the general secretary of the interior ministry to investigate the possibility of a 
revolt in epirus compounded these doubts.32
News of the Batak massacre created several expectations in Greece: firstly it 
was thought that europe would not only favour the Bulgarians and the slavs, 
but that support would be given to all christian subjects of the empire. ottoman 
treatment of the Greeks in crete, epirus, Thessaly and macedonia was considered 
to be the same as, if not worse than, the treatment of slavs in Bulgaria and other 
places. in this vein, according to the Greek press, the “massacre and atrocities 
by the barbarian hordes in Bulgaria justifiably raised distress and sympathy […] 
But did not other christians suffer similarly? […] it is expected that attention by 
england and russia will include all christians of the orient who have the same, 
if not more, rights than the slavs do.”33
The non-realisation of this expectation led to frustration and put a lot of 
pressure on those who favoured continued neutrality, empowering instead the 
supporters of the Great idea. Gladstone’s pamphlet on the Bulgarian horrors – 
30 dakin, Ενοποίηση της Ελλάδας [Unification of Greece], p. 198; kofos, “Greek 
insurrectionary”, pp. 181–183.
31 Άγγελος (15 may 1876).
32 Αλήθεια (29 June 1876 and 29 July 1876). 
33 Αλήθεια (11 November 1876). Αλήθεια (1865–1882) was opposed to koumoundouros’ 
government and supported the opposition. mayer, Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Τύπου [history of 
the Greek press], pp. 114–115.
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reproduced extensively in the Greek press – disappointed its Greek readers by 
failing to mention the Greeks at all. as Αλήθεια reported, “while it [the pamphlet] 
deals with the troubles in the north and is in favour of the just claims of the 
slavs, it abandons christians in the south who are also subjected to crimes by 
the bashi-bazouks and the circassians” (18 November 1876). The same article 
questioned whether an uprising was the only way: “is it only christian blood 
that affects european sentiments? is it only the use of revolutionary action that 
has become the means to achieve claims of justice?” (18 November 1876). This 
disappointment in september 1876 brought unrest to the Greek capital. rallies 
were organised to lobby the koumoundouros government to intervene or for 
the prime minister’s resignation. at the biggest of all, held on 20 september at 
the ancient rock of Pnyka, almost 8,000 people gathered to hear speeches by 
well-respected university professors, politicians and others. The crowd adopted 
a resolution that welcomed european sympathy for the christians of the empire; 
however, it protested the exclusion of the Greeks and urged the government to 
defend the rights of ottoman Greeks while preparing the army for potential 
engagement. in reply, koumoundouros declared that he “was working hard” 
on preparations, but that he could not deal with all the inefficiencies of previous 
governments. over the following weeks, the government introduced a series of 
new laws, preparing the army and the administration for a future intervention.34
a policy of neutrality alongside military preparations was not unanimously 
accepted in Greece. These preparations required vast increases in taxation and 
new international loans, boosting both the public and private debt. Thus, for 
many the burden was too heavy, while the reasons given for increased military 
spending were too vague. For example, Αλήθεια (23 september 1876) argued 
that military preparations had no short-term effect and action was needed 
immediately. For others, such military preparation could not solely be defensive 
and might be perceived by other countries as representing a threat of aggressive 
attack. Finally, for others, the coup in istanbul that replaced sultan abdul aziz 
with murat in may 1876 undermined the urgency of such preparations: the new 
sultan was reported to be a supporter of “liberal and progressive reforms” and 
peace could be secured while the lives of ottoman christians improved without 
any need for revolts.35
despite debates like these, both pro-government and royalist newspapers 
ultimately argued in favour of military preparations. Government supporters 
believed the Great Powers, including russia, were more likely to support the 
34 Αλήθεια (21 september and 23 september 1876). 
35 Αλήθεια (12 July 1876) and Η Ώρα (24 may 1876).
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status quo than to challenge ottoman dominance in the Balkans. They claimed, 
therefore, that military preparation was the best response at this time, as they 
hoped that it would equip the nation for future success when circumstances 
were more appropriate for action. For royalist media, such as Ελληνικός Λαός, a 
policy of preparation was the only option, since it was the king who had imposed 
on koumoundouros the policy of strict neutrality in concert with preparations. 
however, it strongly criticised the koumoundouros government for bad 
economic policy, corruption and unnecessary expenses that undermined the 
case for military preparations.36
The Bulgarian uprising and Batak massacre left Greece in a quandary about 
choosing sides. despite the fact that Bulgarian nationalism had already been 
construed as an enemy by many inside Greece after the schism of 1872, european 
interest in the slavs – greatly increased by the events in Batak – reopened the 
dilemma: would the uprising in the Balkans benefit or undermine the hellenic 
project? This question, which remained pressing for a considerable time, shows 
that the “Bulgarian schism” some years before had not brought definite closure to 
the dilemma. The discussions in the Greek parliament that followed these events 
better highlight the multiple interpretations and give us a deeper understanding 
of the attitudes towards the slavic revolts. 
Hellenism and Panslavism: Traces of Anti-Slavism in the Greek Parliament
The Batak massacre and its possible implications for Greek policy were discussed 
in the Greek parliament, but not as widely as some would have expected. The 
issue was only seriously discussed during the debate on the 1877 budget, in 
November 1876. in this discussion, which focused on the possible consequences 
of the massacre for the Greek cause, one can also see the contemporary attitudes 
that would dominate the debate on the relationship between hellenism and 
slavism. 
koumoundouros (who assumed the premiership in october 1875) defended 
the policy of neutrality in a series of interventions. he also (mostly) indirectly 
gave his own account of the approach towards the slavs by introducing ethnic 
and racial categories to distinguish the Greeks from those revolting against 
the ottomans. For him, despite the “honest sadness for the misfortune the 
massacre brought for our co-religionists, the question was not a Greek question 
neither internally nor externally”. he concluded, therefore, that no change 
was needed in the Greek strategy towards the Balkan uprisings. Greece should 
remain neutral and, at the same time, be prepared for the potential defence of 
36 Άγγελος (18 July 1876) and Ο Ελληνικός Λαός (25 september 1876).
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the Greeks of the empire and a later struggle for their own independence, as 
the slavs had done.37
he went one step further than the above distinction, introducing not only 
an ethnic divide, but also a racial one. as he stated in parliament, the Greek 
response to the revolts should be to defend “the interests of our brothers of the 
same blood”, in order to assist them when the time was appropriate to claim 
independence, like the slavs of the ottoman empire were doing.38 
despite being considered a russophile and slavophile, koumoundouros 
introduced a sharp distinction based on both an ethnic and racial divide, 
separating what was “Greek” from what was not. in that way, he made clear that 
religion (orthodoxy) was not as important as ethnicity and race in determining 
what was relevant to the Greek kingdom and what was not. in other words, the 
victims of the massacre were not only seen as co-members of the orthodox 
millet of the ottoman empire, but as members of a different ethnic and racial 
group. 
koumoundouros’ ethno-racial approach was accompanied by a clarification 
that Greece had its own national interests and should focus on them. These 
interests were limited to defending the rights of the Greeks specifically, rather 
than orthodox subjects in general. The prime minister described Greece’s 
aim as being to “convince europe that hellas prepares and takes action as an 
independent nation and according to its own interest”. in this vein, the success 
of his government lay in the fact that “europeans trust[ed] Greece”; for him, 
this was the key factor permitting Greece to promote its policy in the Balkans. 
This would mean that when an international conference discussed the fate of 
the orient, Greece would be able to seek what it considered to be “the right 
thing”, which is to say self-determination for regions with a predominately 
Greek population.39
an obvious problem with the above stance was the fact that in european 
diplomacy at the time, the Greek issue seemed virtually non-existent. 
even Gladstone had failed to mention the ottoman Greeks in his famous 
denunciation of the ottoman oppression of its subjects. For koumoundouros, 
then, the overlooking of the Greek orthodox populations by european 
statesmen gave the Greek government two options: one was to support Greek 
uprisings in the ottoman territories; the other was to hope for a european 
37 Εφημερίς των Συζητήσεων (30 october 1876), p. 126. 
38 ibid., p. 128. emphasis added.
39 ibid., pp. 128–130. 
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conference that would settle the issues of all orthodox minorities40 in the 
empire, Greeks included: 
let’s not fool ourselves: there is no Greek question [for europe] and 
such questions are not laid out on paper. to raise a Greek question, 
we should have agreed to create unrest in ottoman territories; sirs, 
it is not wise for anyone to prompt his brothers to create unrest if he 
cannot guarantee the result and provide aid especially since we have 
not taken any decision to participate.41
it thus became clear that the government favoured the second option. The 
foreign minister, alexandros kontostavlos, further elaborated on the need for 
a policy of neutrality. in response to an enquiry by the opposition – why was 
Greece not encouraging the Greeks of the ottoman empire to revolt as the slavs 
had done, in order to take advantage of the timing and the present difficulties 
faced by the ottomans? – his reply was that such a policy would draw Greece 
into war: the ottomans could be expected to react violently, as they had done 
in Bulgaria. Neutrality was beneficial to Greece, in the same way that serbia, 
romania and montenegro had benefited from remaining neutral during the 
cretan uprising and the crimean War.42 
There is no doubt that the policy of neutrality aligned Greece with those who 
defended the status quo, and consequently with the interests of the ottoman 
empire. For that reason, despite the definition of the Greek policy as one “of 
neutrality with preparations”, Greece – at least according to its prime minister 
– was also following “a policy of friendship” with its neighbours in anatolia. 
Friendship, however, did not necessarily require total cooperation with ottoman 
interests. The desire to internally reform the empire and Hellenise it from within 
remained squarely on the table. as kontostavlos declared to parliament, “Greece 
is alone”, signalling another period – after that of koumoundouros’ government 
– of comparative Greek isolation. The effort made by the Great Powers to restore 
peace in the Balkans – thereby signalling their preference for the restoration 
40 For the use of the term “minorities” referring to the religious communities constituting 
the orthodox millet during the late nineteenth century, see aron rodrigue, “reflections on 
Millets and minorities: ottoman legacies”, in Turkey between Nationalism and Globalization, 
ed. riva kastoryano, london: routledge, 2013, pp. 36–46; molly Greene, Minorities in the 
Ottoman Empire, london: markus Wiener, 2005; dimitris stamatopoulos, “From millets 
to minorities in the 19th-century ottoman empire: an ambiguous modernization”, in 
Citizenship in Historical Perspective, ed. steven G. ellis, Guðmundur hálfdanarson and ann 
katherine isaacs, Pisa: edizioni Plus/Pisa university Press, 2006. 
41 Εφημερίς των Συζητήσεων (30 october 1876), p. 128. 
42 Εφημερίς των Συζητήσεων (30 october 1876), p. 170.
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of the status quo – indicated to kontostavlos that Greece should be ready to 
potentially act against those powers as well. as he clearly stated: “if we want to 
try something directly or indirectly against the ottomans, we know that we need 
no ally. We further mean by this that not only do we not want european powers 
as allies, but we may even want them as our enemies.”43
The above statements show the extent to which the eastern crisis remained 
an issue of considerable ambivalence within Greece. on the one hand, the 
government favoured friendship with the ottomans and the preservation of the 
status quo, at least in the short term. Friendship aligned Greek policy with British 
policy. however, on the other hand, one might argue that Greece expected to gain 
an advantage from the slavic unrest and hoped to pursue its own claims within 
a diplomatic procedure that would redraw the borders of the ottoman empire. 
From this perspective, independence for the slavs also seemed to promote the 
Greek cause, as the Great Powers were unlikely to leave Greece (whom they 
viewed with “trust”) out of a future redefinition of territory. in this light, Greece’s 
decision to maintain good relations with the ottomans was a solely strategic 
move, chosen only under very particular circumstances; it did not necessarily 
entail a general anti-slavic stance. even declarations that Greece was “alone” 
could be seen as a means of distancing the country from the Western powers. 
indeed, as koumoundouros, at least once, explicitly told parliament, “the only 
rescue [for the orient] will come if all the people of the orient unite as brothers”.44
if the government was trying to achieve a difficult balance between friendship 
with the ottomans and their own hope of gain resulting from the slavic uprising, 
for the opposition things were much clearer. For deligeorgis, the head of 
the second party, the slavs posed a clear threat to hellenism, as the two had 
fundamentally antagonistic interests. The impact of this view was significant, 
as deligeorgis represented the royalist view and was a supporter of British 
influence. as he put it, in a characteristically expressive manner, 
The slavic race took up arms one-and-a-half years ago to seek its 
independence. Their aim is to go beyond haemus to Thrace and 
adrianople [edirne], and in macedonia to reach serres. Their 
struggle is holy! There is nothing for which to blame them; they are an 
admirable nation because they move fast towards progress and glory; 
they have imagination, planning and grand aims. But hellenism is an 
identical nation, with identical interests.45
43  Εφημερίς των Συζητήσεων (30 october 1876), p. 128 and 4 November 1876, p. 167.
44 Εφημερίς των Συζητήσεων (5 November 1876), p. 189.
45 Εφημερίς των Συζητήσεων (1 November 1876), p. 120. haemus is a Balkan mountain 
range in the eastern part of the Balkan Peninsula that separates the central Balkans from the 
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as seen from the above, deligeorgis echoed koumoundouros by introducing a 
racial dimension to separate the Greeks from the slavs, in order to underscore 
that religious affinity was no longer decisive. For deligeorgis, the aims of the 
slavs endangered the interests of hellenism, and the two national movements 
were antagonistic to each other. as he declared in another formulation, 
“[Panslavism] wants to occupy [territories] while threatening political stability; 
it also wishes to dominate hellenism in the orient. it tries to divide the people 
of the orient using money, spies, teachers, priests, armed bands [Komitata] 
and the like.” in a similar spirit, the opposition mP Gerasimos Zochios – soon 
to become naval minister in the deligeorgis government – declared that, “we 
are at war in the orient with both the turks and the slavs”. deligeorgis was 
still more critical of the underlying principle of Greek policy – “peace abroad 
and order inside the country”, which is to say the policy of neutrality – which 
he made clear in parliament: “neutrality assists those who are at war, but it 
does not help the neutral party to gain any rights”. he also questioned whether 
“in the fight between the slavic race and the turks, there are any interests for 
the Greeks”. This approach called for a redefinition of Greek policy, from that 
of neutrality to one of intervention in pursuit of the interests of the Greek 
orthodox communities of the empire.46
Finally, for harilaos trikoupis – who served briefly as prime minister in 
1875 and would take office six more times before 1894 – the political landscape 
was also clear in this regard: hellenism and Panslavism were mutually exclusive 
forces, their shared orthodox religion being purely incidental. For trikoupis, the 
revolution in herzegovina and the massacre in Batak had changed the character 
of the eastern Question. The main consequence of these events became “the 
abandonment of Philhellenism” in europe and its replacement by other ideas 
(Panslavism in particular). in trikoupis’ eyes, this european shift towards 
Panslavism “harmed hellenism”. he therefore called on the government to 
revise its approach, according to which the Balkan uprisings were “internal 
problems of the ottoman empire”. The Greek government, trikoupis said, 
needed to become more interventionist in the course of preparing the military 
and protecting the ottoman Greeks.47
We can see that the main opposition clearly aligned itself against the Balkan 
revolts and their outcome, interpreting them as opposed to the interests of 
aegean sea. “to go beyond haemus” means to expand south, towards the aegean sea into what 
is today Greek macedonia and Thrace. dakin, Ενοποίηση της Ελλάδας [Unification of Greece], 
pp. 197–198.
46  Εφημερίς των Συζητήσεων (5 November 1876), p. 194.
47 Εφημερίς των Συζητήσεων (5 November 1876), pp. 196–197.
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hellenism. opposition leaders, unlike the government, clearly characterised 
Panslavism as posing a threat to Greek interests. however, despite this difference 
in how the government and the opposition perceived the slavic revolts, the 
divide between the so-called russophile koumoundouros government and 
the opposition was not as clear as is generally assumed. Nation and race had 
prevailed over religion for all major political leaders, in spite of their differences 
in political orientation. hellenism and slavism were mutually exclusive, and 
Greek nationalistic discourse predominated, both among the forces within 
Greece that had formerly believed in the coalition of all orthodox people, and 
among those who saw hellenism as a force with the potential to spiritually 
occupy the ottoman empire. 
Sharpening the Frontiers: Hellenism and Panslavism in the Greek Press
as the eastern crisis deepened in 1877 – following the failure of the istanbul 
conference in late 1876 and an impending russo-turkish war – political disputes 
within Greece over which approach to take towards the slavic uprisings intensified. 
The royalist press exerted pressure on koumoundouros’ government, accusing the 
prime minister of “dependency on the interests of Panslavism” and of defending 
slavic and russian interests instead of those of hellenism. The prime minister was 
further accused of failing to bring the rights of the ottoman Greeks to the attention 
of the international community, so as to antagonise the slavic cause in european 
diplomacy. opposition papers argued that Greek policy should turn to the West, 
which was simultaneously the royal position and that of deligeorgis’ party.48
indications in the spring of 1877 that a war between russia and the ottoman 
empire was drawing closer increased concerns for the fate of hellenism; the slavs 
appeared to have taken the upper hand in the orient. many newspapers in the 
Greek kingdom began to openly proclaim their fear of Panslavism, something 
that was not obvious in previous years. For example, Ελληνικός Λαός warned 
that in the event of a russian victory over the ottomans “we will get drawn in 
by slavism”. But the opposing scenario – an ottoman win – was also terrifying, 
at least to the same title, on the basis that it would lead to a massacre of the 
christians. The paper therefore called for intervention, but not directly on the 
part of the Greek state: “it is hellenism that has to take action and not Greece or 
the Greek state”. in accordance with its editorial line, the prospect of hellenism 
taking action referred to various non-governmental initiatives by the Greeks in 
ottoman-controlled areas.49
48 Αλήθεια (21 January 1877 and 29 January 1877). also, Ο Ελληνικός Λαός (15 January 1877).
49 Ο Ελληνικός Λαός (7 may 1877).
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The royalist newspaper Εθνοφύλαξ was prominent in raising awareness of 
the Panslavist threat.50 during the summer of 1877, a series of articles discussed 
the Greek role in the eastern crisis and the relationship between hellenism 
and slavism. For the editor, what was at stake during the eastern crisis was 
whether ancient Greece would reemerge as a “civilising genius” or whether 
Bulgarian “despotism” would dominate instead. The paper described both the 
Greeks and the slavs as the “inheritors” of the empire. however, they represented 
conflicting doctrines on how to exact this inheritance. Panslavism was assisted 
by the russian empire through its funds, diplomats, agents and propagandists. 
on the other hand, hellenism was presumed to operate through spiritual means, 
like the work of teachers and associations that promoted Greek culture. For the 
paper, these two battles were irreconcilable: they could “not ally together; it is 
not possible to ally together”.51
in this way, Greece was presented as seeking justice for historical reasons; 
Greece was also the only nation that could take responsibility for “freedom and 
regeneration of the orient”. Greece was described as the “spirit of civilisation”, 
a “spirit of freedom and a constitutional state […] where no right is suppressed 
and no voice is silenced”. on the contrary, russia – which was presented as 
the political force behind the Panslavist movement – was seen as a force of 
occupation, which embodied a “spirit of assimilation and of fanaticism”. in 
a similar way, Bulgarians and “the other eastern people”, who were identified 
by Εθνοφύλαξ with russia, were pictured as vehicles of despotism, as “semi-
barbarians and uneducated in the majority”.52
of course, the above descriptions and dichotomies were not merely aimed 
at the internal audience in Greece, but primarily at europeans. Εθνοφύλαξ 
transferred the ultimate burden of decision-making to the european powers, 
who were encouraged to decide whether they would support freedom through 
Greece, or despotism through russia and Bulgaria: “in Bulgaria there is a battle 
between two versions of despotism, while the whole world is waiting for the light 
of freedom to come,” as the main article stated. on the other hand, Greece and 
hellenism were pictured as having long been forces that opposed “national and 
religious proselytism”, and it was with such forces that european powers needed 
to cooperate in order to promote “civilisation and freedom”.53
50 Εθνοφύλαξ (1865–1880) was also a strong opponent of koumoundouros. see mager, 
Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Τύπου [history of the Greek press], pp. 91–92.
51 Εθνοφύλαξ (18 July 1877 and 14 august 1877).
52 Εθνοφύλαξ (8 august 1877 and 22 august 1877).
53 Εθνοφύλαξ (20 august 1877).
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as for the slavic uprising and the Greek position, according to Εθνοφύλαξ, 
it was the Panslavist ideology that had undergirded all uprising movements in 
the Balkans and was consequently trying to take control of the eastern Question 
and create feelings of animosity between the slavs and the Greeks. Panslavists 
were seen as attempting to engage Greece in the crisis in order to expose it to 
danger and increase their own gains: “in many ways Panslavism tried to push 
Greece into the battle in order to take advantage of its losses and put its future 
in danger”. This was why the slogan of the Greek nation was, according to 
Εθνοφύλαξ, “no Greek blood in favour of slavic interests!”54 This innovation 
explicitly reintroduced race into the public discourse, as koumoundouros had 
done in parliament several months before, in october 1876. all of these opinions 
led to the same conclusion: Greece had no other option but to remain neutral, 
observe ongoing developments and prepare for a possible future intervention. 
Both the Greek state and hellenism in general, it was emphasised, should not 
be drawn into the conflict.
developments in the eastern crisis and the shift of european interest towards 
the christian slavs of the ottoman empire affected Greek public discourses 
on the slavic movement. hellenism seemed to be restricted by two frontiers: 
the first was ottoman domination, the status quo, and european diplomacy; 
the second was the slavic independence movement and its russian support. it 
seemed that throughout the eastern crisis, the more the christian slavs managed 
to achieve autonomy and independence, the more threatened the Greeks felt. 
This growing perception of the threat posed to hellenism further extended 
the political frontier that the Greeks were introducing into their relationship 
with the slavs. National and racial elements were both added to the discourses 
of politicians and the press, increasing the political antagonism between the 
competing national projects. The use of ethno-racial language within the Greek 
kingdom certainly affected the Greeks of the empire. after 1876 there was a more 
forceful intervention by both state and private institutions in the fight against 
Bulgarian nationalism and the exarchate, and a renewed battle to promote the 
Greek national project.55 
The Eastern Crisis and Greek-Bulgarian National Antagonism
The end of the russo-turkish War in early 1878 left a bitter aftertaste in Greece: 
the slavs seemed to have won out in every respect. The peace treaty signed in 
san stefano (19 February/3 march 1878) established “Greater Bulgaria”, which 
54 Εθνοφύλαξ (24 august 1877 and 28 august 1877).
55 dakin, Ενοποίηση της Ελλάδας [Unification of Greece], pp. 196–200. 
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included territories with large Greek orthodox populations, such as macedonia 
and Thrace. When the final terms of the treaty became publicly known, large 
rallies were organised in the Greek capital, with disappointed demonstrators 
demanding war as a means to defend the rights of Greeks abroad. in January, 
the unrest reached a critical apex when a mob tried to storm the residence of 
the prime minister. Five people were killed and several wounded after being 
shot by the army, and the government collapsed.56 some days later, the Greek 
army marched into Thessaly, not with the stated intention to declare war on the 
ottomans, but ostensibly in order to “guarantee the security of the Greeks”. The 
Greek army was immediately obliged to withdraw by the Great Powers.57 unrest 
also spread among the Greeks of the empire. Throughout the whole spring of 
1878, clashes between armed Greek bands and ottoman soldiers took place in 
crete, Thessaly and epirus. less than one week after the final signing of the 
treaty of san stefano, an armed uprising began in Thessaly, which resulted in the 
establishment of a so-called Provisional administration of domokos Province. 
moreover, Greek associations from macedonia and Thrace sent letters to the 
european governments complaining about the delineation of the borders of 
Bulgaria in the treaty.58
The slavic revolts, and especially the Bulgarian uprising, had a significant 
impact in the ottoman Balkan territories, such as macedonia, where 
antagonism between the Greek and Bulgarian national projects reached a 
high point. much of the slavic-speaking population, who had followed the 
Bulgarian exarchate against the ecumenical Patriarchate, now shifted back 
to the former, fearing ottoman reprisals.59 Greek diplomats in the area did 
not truly remain neutral; they unofficially intervened in order to assist this 
56 Αλήθεια (16 January 1878); Ο Έλλην (18 January 1878).
57 Η Ώρα (22 January 1878). The intervention was met with delight by both the Greek 
press and public opinion, but the army withdrew some days later, as the Greek government 
was – according to the foreign minister – “obliged” to do so. Αλήθεια (30 January 1878).
58 it was reported that there were 8,000 armed civilians in total who moved against the 
ottomans: of them, 6,000 were in the great plain of Thessaly, and 2,000 in the mountains to 
the west. Η Ώρα (11 march 1878 and 3 april 1878).
59 roudometof, Collective Memory, p. 5. For example, by the end of the summer of 
1876, 45 out of the 47 villages in the region of Nevrokopi, drama sanjak, in southeastern 
macedonia, which had previously followed the exarchate, now declared their support for 
the patriarchate. kyriakos lykourinos, “Η διείσδυση της Βουλγαρικής εθνικής κίνησης 
στην περιοχή της Δράμας και η αντιμετώπιση της από το Ελληνικό υποπροξενείο Καβάλας 
κατά την περίοδο της ‘Ανατολικής Κρίσης’ (1875–1878)” [infiltration of the Bulgarian 
national movement in the drama area, and its confrontation by the Greek sub-consulate 
of kavala during the ‘eastern crisis’ (1875–1878)], in Η Δράμα και η περιοχή της: Ιστορία 
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movement. one example of the growing degree of intervention to assist the 
Greek national cause became apparent in the operation of the sub-consulate of 
kavala. since 1876, the sub-consulate had dealt almost exclusively with Greek 
trade issues in the ottoman empire. after 1876, however, a significant portion 
of its workload became concerned with confronting the Bulgarian national 
movement in southeastern macedonia. in order to do so, the sub-consulate 
established a network of informants and collaborators. The local consuls tried 
to include the bishops of the patriarchate in these efforts. By the summer of 
1876, the consuls redoubled their efforts to recruit the bishops, and gave them 
specific recommendations on how to deal with particular Bulgarian agents.60
This example shows that it was a crucial time for the consulates in sensitive 
areas to start acting as centres of Greek irredentist efforts. official institutions 
began to work in close cooperation with Greek community schools, orthodox 
churches, cultural associations and other initiatives to promote the Greek 
national myth and ethnically convert the locals, opposing the Bulgarian, serbian 
and other similar institutions as antagonistic to their cause.61 Through the Greek–
Bulgarian national antagonism, education in the ottoman empire became 
closely linked to irredentist politics. the antagonism that emerged between the 
Greek and Bulgarian national projects in the southern Balkans encouraged the 
application of similar policies on both sides, which in turn functioned as central 
elements of their foreign policies.62 
The end of the eastern crisis – marked by the treaty of Berlin in July 1878, 
which superseded that of san stefano – ushered in a new status quo to the Balkans. 
it recognised de jure independence for Bulgaria – albeit with less generous borders 
than those proposed at san stefano – and for serbia, romania and montenegro. 
και πολιτισμός [drama and its region: history and civilisation], drama: municipality of 
drama, 2013, pp. 567–605. 
60 lykourinos, “Η διείσδυση” [infiltration], p. 518; karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, p. 117. 
61 konstantinos a. Vakalopoulos, Modern History of Macedonia (1830–1912), Thessaloniki: 
Barbounakis, 1988, pp. 179–180; lykourinos, “Η διείσδυση” [infiltration], pp. 579–580. as 
kitromilides argues, the way the Greek state promoted national ideology in the Balkan area 
during the nineteenth century can be viewed as one of the characteristic examples of the 
role of the state in the promotion of national ideology in the area. Paschalis m. kitromilides, 
“‘imagined communities’ and the origins of the National Question in the Balkans”, European 
History Quarterly 19/2 (1989), pp. 160 and 163–177.
62 eleni B. Belia, Εκπαίδευση και αλυτρωτική πολιτική: Η περίπτωση της Θράκης, 1856–
1912 [education and irredentist policies: the case of Thrace, 1856–1912], Thessaloniki: 
institute for Balkan studies, 1995, p. 126; Vakalopoulos, Modern History, p. 161; Barbara 
Jelavič, History of the Balkans, vol. 2, Twentieth Century, cambridge: cambridge university 
Press, 1983, p. 89.
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The treaty also signalled a defining moment for Greek national aspirations – in 
much the same way as the establishment of the Bulgarian exarchate had also 
been – as for the first time other nations besides Greece were recognised as 
independent. Nonetheless, the new treaty did not meet all of the demands of the 
Balkan nationalities. These demands now conflicted violently with one another, 
auguring a new stage in the national struggle.63 The recognition of Bulgarian 
independence put an end to the Greek dream of a hellenic empire and of a Greek 
state that would include all the christian orthodox population of the Balkans. 
at the same time, it renewed and intensified the antagonism between the Greek 
and Bulgarian kingdoms for the ottoman Balkan territories. There, christian 
communities continued to fight for the domination of one or the other’s national 
project and ecclesiastical doctrine. The expanding exarchate, together with the self-
governing Bulgarian territories, provided the institutional framework for Bulgarian 
propaganda in contested areas; similarly, the Greek church and the Greek state 
provided the necessary framework for the establishment of Greek propaganda.
Conclusion
revolts by newly emerging Balkan nations and european support for the 
christian slavs after the Batak massacre were interpreted in different ways within 
Greece. despite official neutrality during the revolts, public debates and political 
struggles took the form of a nationalistic discourse that did not always perceive 
hellenism as an ecumenical idea that could include all the orthodox people 
of the Balkans. Public discourses in the press and parliament manifest how an 
exclusivist rhetoric that differentiated the Greeks from the slavs on both ethnic 
and racial terms was produced and reproduced. This was the case even for the 
koumoundouros government, which was often perceived to have been working 
in pursuit of an orthodox coalition under the protection of russia. 
The slavic revolts marked the collapse of the pro-russian strategy and a rise 
in anti-slavic sentiments in Greece. alignment with the ottomans in order to 
address the slavic threat emerged as the only option. hellenism and slavism were 
presented as mutually exclusive by many commentators. This view was advanced 
within Greece both by those who advocated a coalition of all orthodox people, 
and by those who saw hellenism as a force that could spiritually occupy the 
ottoman empire. The introduction of a more ethno-racial language within the 
Greek kingdom certainly affected the Greeks of the empire and the operations 
of the various institutions that promoted Greek national ideas.
63 l. s. stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, london: hurst, 2000, pp. 468–469. anderson, 
Eastern Question, pp. 217–218. 
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underscoring the importance of the 1875–78 period does not necessarily 
imply that the ideology of anti-slavism in Greece was a product of the eastern 
crisis. What has been emphasised is that this was a crucial period with respect 
to the introduction of a clear distinction, on both an ethnic and a racial basis, 
between the Greeks and other Balkan nations. discussions both in the Greek 
parliament and athenian press show how the events were interpreted inside 
the Greek kingdom in a way that divisions between “us” and “others” were 
constructed and highlighted. 
The eastern crisis left deep divisions in the relationship between the 
Greeks and other nations of the southern Balkans, especially the Bulgarians. 
The process of the nation-states’ emergence through their separation from the 
ottoman empire brought them into antagonism with one another, over both 
the succession of territories and the cultural and religious particularities of their 
populations. emerging national projects constructed the imperial universality 
of the ottoman empire as an other from which national particularities had 
to separate. however, the emerging particularities of the nation-states led 
to antagonistic relations with one another as well. For the Greeks, Bulgarian 
nationalism was to become the primary antagonistic other during this period. in 
the aftermath of the crisis, Bulgarian and Greek nationalisms occupied opposing 
positions and built competing national projects. This competition reached its 
peak in the form of an armed struggle a few decades later, and its traces were felt 
through a large part of the twentieth century.
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